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Abstract: The agency objection to applying distributive justice globally is that 
principles of distributive justice need to apply to the behaviour of a special kind 
of institutional agent of distributive justice because of the special powers of that 
agent. No such agent exists capable of configuring cooperative arrangements 
between all persons globally, and so distributive justice does not apply globally. 
One response to institutional views of this kind is that it does not rule out 
Natural Duties of Justice that fall on all of us to bring about institutional 
agencies capable of global distributive justice. In this paper I argue that this 
move presupposes a particular, teleological, conception of justice whilst 
institutional accounts most plausibly rest on a non-teleological one. I provide an 
argument for favouring the non-teleological conception. I also show why 
alternative ways of arguing for global Natural Duties of Justice do not get 
around this controversy. The debate is at the level of presuppositions about 
justice, and relying on a partisan conception is question begging. 
 
 
In our world no single authority controls how social rights and duties are 
configured for all persons globally. If that is true, can the idea of distributive 
justice between all citizens of the globe have any practical meaning? The agency 
objection to global cosmopolitanism says that principles of distributive justice 
must address a clear agent type, one capable of exercising the special 
institutional authority needed to decide between different cooperative 
arrangements into which it can place people. Distributive justice means an agent 
doing that in a fair way—imposing social cooperative relations in which benefits 
and related burdens are fairly distributed.2 Without such an agent there is no 
clear addressee for these fairness imperatives—no agent that can treat people 
fairly or unfairly in this sense—and so no practical subject to which standards of 
distributive justice are appropriate. The objection in this way links distributive 
justice to clear practical reasons for a specific agent and claims no such agent 
exists globally. But a now common response is that the presence of institutional 
agency is merely a feasibility condition for implementing justice.3 Whether justice 
is currently feasible is, however, irrelevant to whether the concepts of justice 
and injustice apply in a given sphere. Those concepts are about distributive 
outcomes for people, desirable patterns of distribution, such as secured equal 
opportunities, continued improvement of life chances for the worst-off, or global 
basic interest fulfilment. The absence of the relevant outcome is itself an injustice 
and the absence of institutional agents capable of arranging that outcome is just 
a feature of that injustice. This view separates implementation of justice by a 
capable agent from the content of justice which focuses on distributive 
outcomes. On this view, practical reason simply refers to whatever is necessary 
(within what is practicable) to bring about a desired outcome. In the absence of 
implementing institutions globally, for example, we merely shift focus to 
individuals and their “natural duties” to create these institutions. Both the duties 
of institutions and individuals can be just or unjust in instrumental terms: 
according to their relation to implementing the outcome. The concepts of justice 
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and injustice on this view apply to people’s conditions regardless of  the 
presence of implementing agents because agents still exist with natural duties to 
bring about the implementing agents. Call this the “Natural Duties of Justice” 
(NDJs) response.4 
 
The problem with this response, and its conception of NDJs, is the distinct and 
contentious account of distributive justice on which it relies. It takes distributive 
justice to firstly describe distributive outcomes for people (perhaps with some 
sensitivity to personal choice and responsibility in defining those outcomes). 
Implementing agencies, on this view, can be just or unjust only in a secondary or 
derivative way, in terms of whether they play an instrumental role. Institutional 
agency does not tell us anything about the core content of distributive justice, 
only how much justice is currently feasible. Yet, a plausible version of the agency 
objection can be framed as rejecting conceptions of distributive justice that focus 
on outcomes independently of considering what fairness can require of specific 
agents. Rather, it characterises distributive justice as how a special type of agent 
treats those over whom it legitimately exercises authority; justice and injustice 
are simply descriptions of the fairness or unfairness of its treatment of those 
people. What is special about the agent is its ability to impose different 
arrangements of socially recognised rights and duties, thus framing social-
cooperative relationships. That can be done fairly or unfairly, which does not, as 
I will show, reduce to whether this agency aims to produce the most desirable 
outcomes. Only such an agent can, as I will argue, act in ways that are just or 
unjust in terms of distributive justice. If this conception of justice is coherent, 
then on it a natural duty to bring about global distributive institutions cannot be 
grounded in that sense injustice, given no legitimate authority is in a position to 
arrange social rights and duties either fairly or unfairly across the globe, though 
other moral standards may, of course, apply. NDJs to create such an agent, on the 
other hand, would have to be a different kind of moral standard: one focused on 
producing desirable outcomes, nor on fair treatment. As I will show, there are 
reasons to question natural duties based on outcome-desirability. The NDJ 
response against the agency objection, then, simply appeals to a concept of 
justice that is controversial to at least some versions of that objection and so 
begs the question against it. 
 
In section I, I distinguish outcomes- vs treatment-focused conceptions of 
distributive justice, showing why they are indeed different and how global NDJs 
only make sense on the former: on the treatment-focused conception 
distributive justice and injustice only describe special qualities of institutional 
action. In II, I give one core reason to prefer a treatment-focused conception. 
This is the argument from practical fairness, which explains why global 
responsibilities of equal concern cannot apply directly to individuals. In III, I 
consider alternative grounds for global NDJs, given that relying on outcomes-
focused conceptions of justice begs the question against the agency objection and 
conflicts with practical fairness. These alternative grounds include rescue duties, 
imperfect duties, human rights obligations, or reasons based in the arbitrariness 
of political membership. I argue that either these moral concepts are interpreted 
as versions of the outcomes-focused conception of justice, and so violate 
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practical fairness or, on plausible alternative interpretations, they do not actually 
support NDJs to bring about global distributive outcomes at all. 
 
I – The deeper dispute  
 
The idea that individuals have duties to “further just arrangements” when it is 
not too costly to do so originates in Rawls’ notion of natural duties of justice. 
However, Rawls proposed this idea in part as a solution to the problem of which 
moral duties apply to individuals in relation to the arrangements of rights and 
duties established by institutions that “apply to them”.5 Rawls here refers to 
institutions with powers to configure cooperative arrangements for specific 
groups of people.6 Yet theorists who argue that distributive justice applies 
globally hold that we have NDJs to [work to] supply everyone with institutions 
that can secure certain distributive outcomes. If there are good moral reasons 
why people should enjoy a certain distribution in the context of domestic 
political institutions the same reasons should justify their claim to enjoy that 
distribution even where the institutions that might arrange it do not yet exist.7 
That claim is held against each and every agent in a position to establish 
institutions that will secure that outcome for all persons globally. 
 
Outcomes-focused approaches 
Distributive justice here is clearly defined, firstly, in terms of people’s conditions 
and applies to agency only in a derivative sense. It asks whether people have 
access to resources to satisfy important interests or whether a certain 
distributive pattern is in place for them, such as whether there is equal access to 
important goods for all, priority access for the least advantaged, equal 
opportunities to access these goods, or some other favoured set of outcomes. So, 
for example, Buchanan takes global justice to reside in the ‘Moral Equality 
principle’, which means that people are entitled as human beings to the secure or 
protected enjoyment of key interests (which in the global context Buchanan 
identifies with basic human rights). Institutions are instrumental to protecting 
these interests with obligations flowing from that aim. People, as agents, too 
have duties flowing from the aim, such as to avoid harming these interests or to 
secure them for others by helping to set up institutions capable of protecting 
them.8 Crucially, our protection-enhancing duties do not flow from the 
requirement that institutions treat those under their dominion rightly rather 
than wrongly; they flow from the value or desirability of everyone having these 
protections (the outcomes) given the value of “the interests that respect for basic 
human rights promotes”.9 Whether treatment is just or unjust on this view 
simply reflects whether it is aimed at securing these interests. By focusing on 
outcomes, theorists can say there are demands of distributive justice even where 
no one actively thwarts these interests. 
 
It follows that this approach draws no fundamental distinction between a duty to 
secure basic interests for others, say by securing access to resources or 
protections, and a duty to respect those interests by not thwarting them.10 What 
matters is their secure enjoyment, not the route to securing it. The only 
consideration on the supply side is whether we can secure these interests for all 
others without “exorbitant” or “excessive” personal cost.11 Nevertheless, 
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whether or not it happens to currently imply excessive costs does not change the 
characterisation of justice as secure access to the satisfaction of these interests 
and injustice as its absence. In fact, we can obviate “exorbitant” costs to 
ourselves by contributing to institutions that secure the interests less 
expensively. So, the point of the duties, the entitlements, remains constant whilst 
the requirements they imply for us are modified by the institutional landscape. If 
acting is excessively costly, that can mitigate what is demanded of us whilst the 
outcomes to which it aims remain unaffected. For Buchanan, the outcomes are 
certain secure levels of “well-being” for all which constitute the content of their 
rights. We, as agents, must do “what is necessary to ensure that their rights are 
not violated” meaning they do not suffer insecurity of their basic interests.12 If 
the focus of justice is “basic human interests” of “such profound moral 
importance” that they “ought to be protected”, then we ought to take on 
significant burdens both to avoid endangering those interests, and to get them 
protected from third parties, by institutions.13  
 
As I have highlighted, the justice of institutions’ decisions here derives from their 
instrumental role in securing the relevant just outcomes defining distributive 
justice. The justice of the outcomes, on the other hand does not derive from the 
justice of any action or decision. As applied to institutional behaviour, then, 
justice and injustice refer to whether such behaviour aims at producing the 
desirable distributive outcomes. The order of moral explanation is from the 
justice of outcomes to that of actions, and not vice versa, so that injustice can 
describe the absence of such outcomes even in the absence of institutional 
agents capable of acting securing them. This is also true of individual behaviour, 
which exhibits justice where people support or seek to establish institutions that 
can produce the relevant outcomes. 
 
Caney too, explicitly adopts an outcomes-focused approach. In his account justice 
is a pattern of distribution and injustice is its absence. The justice of that pattern 
is also for him a separate matter from its implementation.14 Institutional, 
political, actors are “instrumental” to achieving justice.15 They are just or unjust 
in terms of how they serve the relevant outcome, which is to say in terms of their 
“impact on persons’ interests”.16 Injustice describes the fact that some people are 
in worse situations than others, irrespective of whether anyone imposes that 
disparity and irrespective of whether anyone can alter it.17 Thus justice applies 
to patterns of distribution first, and to institutions, as implementing agents, only 
in terms of how their actions serve such patterns. This allows Caney to 
characterise certain outcomes as just or unjust, fair or unfair, regardless of 
whether they are the product of just or unjust institutional treatment. Again, 
outcomes on this approach do not derive their justice or injustice from the 
fairness of an agent treating people in a certain way. Rather, institutional actions 
and decisions, however, do derive their justice and injustice from the outcomes 
they create or allow. 
  
This same outcomes-focus and agent-instrumentalism is present in Abizadeh’s 
criticism of institutional views of distributive justice. For him, “social 
cooperation can indeed be a demand, not an existence condition, of justice” and 
“demands of distributive justice may arise not only when a scheme of social 
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cooperation exists, but also when it ought to exist.”18 This is because of the 
“appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens” it makes possible.19 He does 
not use the terminology of natural duties, but does say in relation to social 
cooperative institutions: “if a necessary constitutive or instrumental condition is 
missing, justice precisely demands the realisation of those conditions.”20 What is 
unjust about circumstances without such institutions is the absence of that 
which those institutions are needed to implement—distributive outcomes—and 
institutional actions derive their justice from working to realise those outcomes 
for people. 
  
The same view is implicit in Ronzoni’s claim that we can have a coherent sense of 
“background injustice” in the absence of such institutions because without them 
people will experience the unfair consequences of accumulated, but individually 
innocent, transactions.21 On this view, people suffer injustice by suffering the 
patterns of relative disadvantage that emerge over time, even if no specific agent 
is morally responsible, either by action or omission, for imposing conditions 
under which these patterns can emerge.22 Ronzoni, echoing Abizadeh, sees the 
absence of institutions capable of rectifying these emerging disadvantages as 
part of the injustice itself.23 All of which implies that for these theorists justice 
and injustice are characteristics of certain outcomes or patterns of outcomes 
experienced by people, regardless of whether any agent is currently in a position 
to directly implement the better ones.24 Agents that can correct these conditions 
are instrumentally relevant to justice and the avoidance of injustice; 25 their 
actions are derivatively just or unjust as feasibility conditions for justice;26 and 
just and unjust treatment is itself defined in terms of the outcomes. 
 
Views of this kind accept some degree of mitigation for duties to bring about the 
desired patterns of distribution. But they do not begin by asking what kind of 
burdens can fairly be imposed on agents for the sake of others, deriving the 
content of justice (and just outcomes) from that notion of fairness. Rather, the 
content of justice simply depends “on a proper recognition of what I owe you as 
a person” which is to do something about protecting your basic interests even if 
this implies “significant costs”.27  When determining what these duties mean on a 
case-by-case basis we have some permission not to shoulder excessive 
sacrifices.28 But how we can judge what is excessive is left unclear and we must 
anyway make every “non-excessive” sacrifice necessary to produce the right 
outcomes. 
 
This is a teleological conception of distributive justice. It defines justice in terms 
of a valued aim—the outcomes—and derives what it requires from any agent 
from this aim, with the high threshold of practicality or excessiveness as the only 
constraint on what can be expected. By contrast, below I set out a view of 
distributive justice as a form of institutional treatment of persons the justice of 
which does not derive from outcome desirability. On the contrary, the justice of 
any given outcome depends on whether, in bringing it about, institutions thereby 
treat people fairly. Fairness here has two elements: both the benefit of the 
treatment and the burdens required to produce it. The distinction between 
outcomes-focused and treatment-focused conceptions of distributive justice has 
received little attention in debates on what constitutes the right pattern of 
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distribution, as protagonists have tended to presuppose the context of a political 
order, political community, or institutional agency.29 Nevertheless, institutional 
agency is notoriously explicit in Rawls’ description of the subject of justice and in 
Dworkin’s explanation of the scope of equal concern.30 Some authors do 
explicitly attack this non-teleological approach, arguing that the justice of actions 
can only be explained in terms of the desirability of the distributive states of 
affairs they aim to bring about.31 Others hold the contrasting view that what can 
be fairly required of people determines the fairness of the distributive outcomes 
they can produce.32 
 
The alternative approach 
The non-teleological approach sees distributive justice as a quality of the 
behaviour of special types of institutions, and derives the justice of distributive 
outcomes from that. The special import of that behaviour also explains why 
distributive justice is restricted to evaluating how these institutions treat specific 
groups of people; it constitutes a kind of treatment that institutions cannot 
extend to or withhold from others outside the group. In simple terms, on this 
view justice is the answer to a special moral problem: given institutional agents 
exist, with special powers, how should those agents act. 
 
Some institutions have the authority to configure arrangements of socially 
recognised rights and duties for a group of people, by which I mean rights and 
duties with social authority such as legal authority (I come to the basis of that 
below). That power is special. It actively and continuously places those people in 
relationships of indirect and imposed cooperation. It assigns rights to some and 
duties to others that uphold these rights in ways that lend social authority to 
those assignments. Some duties, such as respecting property, directly 
correspond to the rights; others, such as paying taxes, make the rights possible. 
Which means some people carry social burdens for the sake of the of others 
enjoying social benefits. These types of relations are not accidents of nature. 
They are due to institutional agencies exercising authoritative powers to choose 
between different possible social-cooperative arrangements of rights and duties. 
  
This form of cooperation differs fundamentally from direct cooperation between 
individuals, which can exist without being arranged by institutions. Institutions 
can set an authoritative framework that fixes cooperative terms ex ante for 
everyone, and thus constrains personal cooperative decisions for those subject 
to the legitimate authority of these institutions. But individuals cooperating to 
achieve their own ends cannot configure that kind of framework. They cannot set 
the context of socially accepted rights and duties defining property ownership 
and its limits both for the co-operators and for everyone else. The same goes for 
rights to enter into contracts with particular protections, and rights to engage in 
certain forms of productive activity such as paid work. Yet control of such terms 
shapes and defines how people can engage in cooperation. This is an especially 
social form of cooperation the terms of which are not under the control of people 
through direct acts of cooperation which they do control. Direct inter-personal 
cooperation is of course subject to interpersonal moral standards such as 
reciprocity or fair dealing. But, a different kind of fairness is appropriate for 
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evaluating cooperative institutions’ imposing of social right and duty 
arrangments on those subject to their authority.  
 
Institutional cooperative arrangements link social benefits for some to the 
corresponding social burdens making them possible for specific others; a link 
that could not exist were it not for institutions with the power to set socially 
recognised rights and duties. Where the arrangements are beneficial to people 
they represent goods for them that are not separable from the social burdens 
imposed to make those goods possible. These benefits are therefore more than 
desirable items or consumables. They are irreducibly social goods, given that an 
arrangement of property rights, with a specific understanding of the extent and 
limits that ownership implies, requires institutions to assign the necessary 
burdens for upholding the arrangement for all. Each social-cooperative good 
extended to people thus reflects an arrangement by institutions where some 
shoulder burdens to allow its provision. Were it not for that institutionally 
imposed relationship—a form of institutional mediation—there could be no 
decisions to withhold or extend these special burden-imposed-for-the-sake-of-a-
benefit goods to people. For that reason comparing people’s enjoyment of such 
benefits with enjoyment of any given amount of non-social goods, whether in the 
state of nature our outside of it, fails to take into account all relevant moral 
matters.33 The non-social goods do not require special burden-benefit relations 
to make enjoying them possible, unlike enjoying property. That it is desirable 
that someone enjoys non-social goods does not automatically raise the moral 
question of whether and why some specific other person should shoulder the 
relevant burden. With social cooperative goods the two questions are always 
entangled—arranging a social right implies at least prospective burdens for 
others.34 
 
This is important because with non-social goods we can ask whether one 
distribution is more desirable than another simply in terms of the goods or 
losses people have. With social goods, however, we must ask whether the 
distribution is fair given how the arrangements link burdens to benefits: whether 
it is fair that Jay shoulders these costs for-the-sake-of Kay enjoying these 
benefits. Institutions imposing such arrangements can show or fail to show equal 
concern for those subject to their cooperative requirements. For example, equal 
concern is breached where institutions impose duties on citizens to uphold 
rights beneficial only for an elite group. Direct cooperation between people lacks 
this component of a mediating agent exercising authority to create special 
cooperative relationships. Whilst direct interpersonal cooperation requires 
respect and reciprocal fairness in taking on burdens for mutual benefit, it is not 
reasonable to require of those entering into such direct cooperative agreements 
that in doing so they also arrange rights and duties for others to show equal 
concern for everyone’s prospects over a lifetime. Individuals lack the social 
authority to make those kinds of arrangements by setting rights and duties to be 
recognised by all. Not only that, but taking on the burdens of doing this for all 
persons by modifying the terms of each transaction would undermine the whole 
point of direct interpersonal cooperation. It would prevent people using a 
mutually respectful means to achieve their own ends. Given the existence of 
social goods depends on institutional authority and its imposition of burdens, the 
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key question for any arrangement by such authorities is whether it shows equal 
concern to all those placed in cooperative relationships (on both sides of the 
imposed benefit-burden link). This is not least because each agent as well as 
recipient has a life to lead that is affected by burden shares. Thus the moral 
values governing this kind of distribution will be fundamentally different from 
those applying to direct interpersonal cooperation, where respect for consent 
and reciprocity are appropriate. As special third parties, mediating institutions 
have the special responsibilities of equal concern. 
  
Teleological views of distributive justice, on the other hand, focus on goods such 
as satisfying people’s needs that are not inherently social in this way. They may 
accept constraints relating to excessiveness of cost and feasibility, but these do 
not define what justice requires, only how much justice can be achieved at any 
one time. They do not incorporate a clear justification of any specific burden as 
fairly imposed, below this high threshold. They either ignore the fair burden 
question or assume it is settled by mentioning an “excessiveness” cap, though 
that is never clearly defined. Social cooperation does not raise any special moral 
question of fairness on these views and does not therefore ground any special 
concepts of justice and injustice.35 It matters only in producing the desired 
outcomes. Teleological views cannot ,then, say why equality demands any one 
person in the world carries the burdens for the sake of any other, only that 
everyone has a duty, under the high bar of non-excessiveness, to work towards 
the relevant outcomes for all.36  
 
The treatment-focused account, by contrast, focuses on a special standard of 
fairness for institutions that impose cooperative relationships on those subject 
to their authority. Whilst one can compare how people fare outside and inside 
institutional arrangement in terms of their bare conditions, one cannot make the 
comparison in terms of social cooperative goods. Those goods are essentially 
linked to the burdens of specific other people and so raise the question of 
whether these specific burden-benefit relations are fairly imposed by 
institutions. The view allows for the possibility, for example, that the same 
distribution in terms of bare goods might be fair in one case and unfair in 
another, depending on the associated burdens of producing it (even where 
neither breaches any high threshold of “excessiveness”). Simply comparing 
people’s bare condition ignores this fairness component. 
 
Crucially, on this account, the moral standards of distributive justice and 
legitimate authority to impose cooperative relationships are distinct. 
Distributive justice, the imposition of fair social cooperative relationships, 
presupposes institutions with moral authority to impose those relationships. 
Institutions can get it wrong as to what social fairness requires, and still exercise 
legitimate authority for their political community. However, this is why, within 
reasonable bounds, institutions must not fail to show equal respect to citizens in 
the form of fundamental rights.37 One test for reasonableness in political and 
legal authorities is whether the institutions respect standards of treatment 
without which it could hardly be said that the institutions rule by anything other 
than coercion and threat. The standards minimally include human rights, the 
rule of law, authentic and working mechanisms for consulting citizens or 
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representing their interests in political deliberations (even if full democracy is 
not present), and some minimal rights in social and economic cooperation that 
allow people to be active participants of society.38 The test for legitimate 
institutions is here based on the idea of genuine political community, rather than 
rule by violence. The way legitimate institutions treat those subject to them 
(within the bounds of legitimacy) thus represents the way the political 
community treats its members. A polity, on this view, might mistakenly but 
reasonably adopt a flawed version of distributive justice without thereby de-
authorising its institutions. Legitimacy, here, does not turn on how a polity and 
its membership came about but rather whether institutions can meet the above 
tests for exercising powers to impose social rights and duties over a specific 
group of people. 
 
The treatment-focused conception of distributive justice, then, is an answer to 
the question of how such authoritative institutions should act, given they have 
the above kind of special cooperation-configuring authority. It contrasts with 
teleological views in that they do not accord special responsibility for justice to 
any party: each and all are potentially responsible for producing outcomes. On 
the treatment-focused approach legitimate public institutions have a special 
relationship to a specific group of people that they are able to treat either fairly 
or unfairly in arranging special social cooperative relations between them. On 
the teleological view injustice can simply mean the absence of relevant 
outcomes, where they might be produced by “non-excessive” burdens. On the 
non-teleological view distributive injustice is wrongful treatment by cooperation 
configuring institutions, given the different arrangements open to them to 
impose, such as where they fail to show equal concern to those under their 
authority. Both distributive justice and injustice are standards applying to a 
specific agent’s choices and behaviour on this view, and cannot apply in the 
absence of an agent capable of that behaviour. 
 
Public institutions impose some duties on people outside their particular 
political community, such as duties not to cross their borders under certain 
circumstances. However, in doing this, institutions do not arrange an on-going 
cooperative relationship between those inside and those outside a state. They 
cannot, for example, arrange property rights or income tax for those outside of 
their jurisdiction. They cannot, therefore, arrange social goods in a way that 
shows equal concern to all persons as co-operators enjoying social benefits or 
shouldering corresponding burdens. So, while some moral standards apply to 
border powers on this view they are just not the same ones applying to how on-
going cooperative relations should be arranged. Similarly, whilst a scheme of 
globally recognised property rights exists, no authority or group of authorities 
can configure these for all. The recognition and adjudication of such rights, as 
reflected in international private law, derives from the moral legitimacy of 
domestic arrangements; no non-domestic form of legitimate authority exists to 
create and impose property rights. The internationally recognised rights and 
duties of states, including territorial rights, on the other hand, are part of a 
system of custom, sometimes codified through treaties the legitimacy of which 
also derives from the legitimacy of domestic institutions. Even if these sources 
were illegitimate, there is no alternative source of legitimate authority capable of 
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altering or legislating such custom. At best mechanisms exist for resolving 
disputes over its interpretation and application.39 Again, while some moral 
standards plausibly apply to state interactions, such as the setting of trade terms, 
and to the protection of global public goods such as the environment, the agents 
and types of powers in play call for different kinds of cooperative standards than 
those applicable to institutions that configure social cooperative arrangements 
between people. In the absence of a single universal right- and duty-imposing 
authority for all, fairness in trade must take a different form on this view.40 
Treating a political community fairly in international agreements, which must be 
sensitive to legitimate authority, does not translate into creating cooperative 
arrangements of equal concern for its members. 
 
In sum, then, without an agent to treat people fairly or unfairly in how it 
arranges these special cooperative relationships there is no appropriate subject 
of which to predicate distributive justice or injustice, because there is no 
appropriate agent of equal concern. 
 
Are the treatment-focused and outcomes-focused views truly distinct? After all, 
outcomes-focused views might simply define treatment in terms of producing 
the relevant outcomes for people. The key difference is that treatment views do 
not derive institutional agent responsibilities simply from the desirability of an 
outcome. They rather define justice and injustice itself in a way that is sensitive 
to the burdens that can fairly imposed to produce a distribution. Both those on 
the benefit and burden sides of cooperation must be treated fairly in relation to 
each other. Below I argue that individuals cannot be required to treat people 
with this kind of equal concern. 
 
II – Justice and practical fairness 
So far I have merely set out the non-teleological conception of distributive justice 
as a coherent account. I will now present an argument to lend it prima facie 
support. The argument speaks to the question of why attributions of justice and 
injustice should not simply extend to matters over which other agents, including 
individuals, have some effect. This is the argument from practical fairness. 
 
Practical fairness limits the burdens people can be expected to shoulder for the 
sake of others to those that do not require them to abandon, deprioritise, or stop 
pursuing their own commitments. Whether the ends and priority orderings in 
question are essential for a person or not is not relevant here. Only that they are 
hers and matter to her. This constraint is important because it reflects the moral 
value of people living distinct lives which they define by exercising their faculty 
for developing attachments, adopting ends, prioritising some of these, and 
pursuing them. Respect for this personal distinctness means treating people as 
sovereigns over the exercise of that self-defining faculty. Failure to respect that 
distinctness can take the form of interfering with the exercise of this faculty but 
also of turning its exercise into a resource by requiring people deprioritise their 
own life ends in favour of ones that lead to greater social benefits. Accounts of 
distributive justice must respect this practical fairness constraint if they are to 
respect people as distinct ends rather than treat them purely as means to a social 
goal.41 
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Of course, not all personal priorities are compatible with the value behind 
practical fairness, which also grounds limits on what we must respect. So, 
consider religious aims requiring people to dismiss others’ views and choices to 
the point of using credible threats to interfere with their adopting, prioritising, 
or pursuing them. Such commitments imply lack of respect for others’ 
sovereignty over the exercise of their capacity to define their own priorities. The 
religious believer might be said to have a faith-based interest in doing this. 
However, that interest should not be given any weight in deciding people’s 
rights. It is not simply “outweighed” by others’ interests, but its inherent 
incorporation of disrespect discounts it altogether, making it irrelevant to moral 
deliberations about social arrangements. Even if refraining from interfering with 
people’s faculty for self-definition is a cost to the believer’s interest satisfaction, 
that must have no weight at all in deciding what is permitted. This kind of 
consideration discounting extends beyond basic freedoms to resource-affecting 
considerations. Consider an attempt to use religious commitments as grounds 
for refusing social health provision to members of a minority faith. The 
implication that one can be thus punished for one’s commitments implies a lack 
of respect for our sovereignty in adopting, prioritising, and pursuing these 
commitments. Such considerations should also have no weight in deliberations, 
however important they are to those offering them. This form of consideration 
discounting constitutes simple equal respect. It does not mandate any particular 
resource distribution, but it does place limits on how resources can be 
distributed or withheld. 
  
Consider now the distinct question of how to adjudicate between every person’s 
access to resources to be used in pursuing their different (equal respect-
compatible) aims. What burdens can people be expected to bear to allow or 
supply resources to others so they can pursue potentially competing but 
reasonable goals? This question is not in the same ballpark as asking whether we 
can dismiss certain considerations for action as invalid. It is about bearing costs, 
including opportunity costs, for the sake of facilitating others’ pursuit of their 
ends. 
 
If the only relevant criterion for shouldering burdens of this kind was that other 
people’s interests reach a certain threshold of importance for them, and that the 
burdens are feasible, this has a problematic upshot. It generalises to the principle 
that whenever another person’s end is of a certain degree of importance then we 
must relinquish our own ends in order to advance it. That principle effectively 
means giving up a life in which we can prioritise our own commitments, unless 
they reach the importance threshold or contribute towards satisfying the 
threshold interests of others. Which is to treat our capacity to adopt, develop, or 
prioritise ends as a social resource given over to serving other people’s basic 
wellbeing. Whilst saintly, this does not so much adjudicate between other’s 
interests and the distinct importance of our adopting, prioritising, and pursuing 
our own ends as quash the latter. As a principle, it violates practical fairness, not 
because it imposes too many costs but because it imposes costs of a categorically 
problematic kind. 
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The problem here lies in making equal concern a responsibility of individuals, 
which in turn imposes an obligation on each person to yoke her capacity to 
develop, prioritise, and pursue distinct ends to the cause of achieving a social 
outcome. Given such a responsibility is fundamentally incompatible with basic 
equal respect, individuals cannot be the agents of equal concern. How people fare 
in relation to each other is not a concern that can govern the adoption of every 
individual life priority and end, if we are to respect their lives as theirs. Of 
course, individuals have equal respect obligations, which means respecting the 
boundaries of other people’s self-sovereignty, and sometimes remedying those 
whose boundaries they cross. But within the confines of people acting with equal 
respect, equal concern requires an agent capable of fair treatment in terms of 
how resources are distributed between people, regardless of whether they 
would otherwise be in a position to individually interact with each other. 
  
Teleological accounts do not firmly distinguish equal respect and equal concern. 
They claim that interests sufficiently important to justify each of us owing people 
equal respect must be sufficient to also justify owing them equal concern. 
Buchanan even claims that accepting one responsibility without the other is 
“incoherent” or “laughably anaemic”.42 So such accounts need to answer the 
problem that requiring individuals to be the agents of (to show) equal concern 
fails the practical fairness test. 
 
An answer here might be that teleological views do not require ‘first order 
impartiality’ mandating us as persons to treat even our own commitments 
impartially in relation to others’. Institutions, rather than individuals, can be 
charged with treating us with equal concern.43 Institutions can impartially assign 
benefits and burdens to us, avoiding the requirement on us to abandon personal 
life priorities to pursue first order impartiality. Unfortunately, this is either an ad 
hoc restriction on outcomes views, and fails for that reason, or it accepts the 
practical fairness constraint, and the restrictions of the non-teleological 
approach apply. The teleological approach makes the justice-relevant outcomes, 
whether secured interest thresholds or distributive patterns, everyone’s 
responsibility. If equal concern means a distributive outcome, then we all owe 
each other equal concern.44 Because of this responsibility we owe all other 
persons NDJs to create institutions capable of second order impartiality. Framing 
NDJs in this way (and there are other ways, see below) means we must adopt the 
personal project of creating these institutions as a life priority. Otherwise it is 
unclear in what sense these are genuine demands of justice as a practical notion. 
If our actions are to have the effect of actually creating institutions we must 
deprioritise all our non-basic ends in favour of adopting the personal goals and 
life priorities of working for global institutional transformation. Reasoning 
purely from outcomes and what we must do to deliver them, then, fails to shield 
individuals from practical fairness-threatening implications. On the other hand, 
the separation between requirements on institutions versus individuals might be 
safeguarded by accepting the practical fairness constraint and focussing 
distributive justice on second-order (institutional) impartiality alone. But that 
undermines the idea that the desirability of outcomes is by itself enough to 
generate practical reasons outside of an order where institutions can act 
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impartially. One also needs a certain kind of agent to be present for which these 
are appropriate reasons. 
 
On the non-teleological conception, distributive justice is a special standard 
applying to agents with the power to decide how social cooperative relations are 
arranged, because they have that power. It is able to avoid conflict with practical 
fairness because social rights and duties can be fairly imposed by such an agent 
without requiring that people abandon personal life priorities and pursuits in 
favour of social goals. However, given these arrangements affect the resources 
and opportunities people have to pursue their personal ends, the institutions 
have a responsibility to choose between alternative arrangements in a way that 
shows equal concern for those pursuing their different personal ends. The only 
way to assign resources in a way that is compatible with practical fairness is with 
a conditional account of resource acquisition: cooperative arrangements permit, 
and facilitate, people seeking resources for their own ends, but only in ways that 
are socially beneficial. Thus, people more successful at acquiring resources 
towards their projects have opportunities to do so, but only in ways that also 
generate resources for those who are less successful.45 Conditional accounts do 
not impose requirements on our personal priorities and ends, yet by imposing 
such cooperative conditions the political community shows equal concern to all 
those over whom it exercises its cooperation-arranging authority.46 Teleological 
accounts, on the other hand, do not treat people as co-operators with their own 
ends entitled to a certain treatment in that capacity, but only as recipients 
according to the required distributive outcome or as instruments, unprotected 
by practical fairness, towards achieving that outcome. 
 
This leaves teleological approaches with two options. They can bite the bullet 
and say no person has special rights to decide the personal commitments she 
adopts, prioritises, or pursues in her life, but all must adopt, prioritise, and 
pursue the relevant outcomes as a personal goal. Alternatively, they might adopt 
an account that is consistent, or partially consistent, with practical fairness. One 
way holders of these views attempt this, as I have pointed out, is by bracketing 
the issue. They borrow the vocabulary of rescue (to which I shall come below) 
with disclaimers that people’s duties, including NDJs, should not impose costs 
that are “exorbitant” or “excessive” rather than “reasonable”.47 Yet what is 
reasonable is precisely the problem in these views. An account of distributive 
justice solely focused on the desirability of outcomes cannot explain why it 
unreasonable to require people, as a matter of moral obligation, to turn their 
adoption of personal commitments and prioritisation of life projects to pursue 
solely those that contribute to the desired global distributive outcome.  On the 
other hand, admitting a practical fairness constraint on non-teleological grounds 
will undermine the claim that distributive justice standards apply regardless of 
the kind of agent present to respond for those standards. 
 
The point here is not that there is a duty to contribute whatever we can towards 
global outcomes and we just have a minor problem in deciding how to mitigate 
the sacrifices this implies. That would be a teleological interpretation of the 
‘demandingness’ problem.48 The above argument challenges the very idea that 
we can justify a duty to adopt an outcome as a goal or priority for an agent based 
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solely on considerations of the general desirability of that outcome and that 
agent’s abilities. Only duties consistent with practical fairness are morally 
warranted. Teleological views have a problem satisfying that test because 
practical fairness is not integral to any of the desirable outcomes they propose. 
The justice or injustice of outcomes is supposed to lie in their desirability for 
people, independently from evaluating what is necessary to implement them (or 
its clash with practical fairness) which is a feasibility, rather than conceptual, 
question on such views. But that, if anything, is an anaemic conception of justice, 
emptying it of practical content. I now show how theorists proposing a Natural 
Duties of Justice response to the problem of agency at the global level rely on a 
teleological conception. 
 
III - Natural duties and justice 
 
For teleological views there is no moral difference between individuals directly 
implementing a distributive outcome or contributing indirectly, say by creating 
the institutions that can directly implement a pattern of distribution.49 Agents 
must simply do what they can, directly or indirectly, towards achieving the 
relevant outcome. NDJs to create institutions that can do the implementing make 
perfect sense on this view. If duties of justice derive from the value of the 
outcomes, then that value will ground duties to do whatever we can, within what 
is feasible and “non-excessive”, to make sure everyone gets that outcome. This 
may include creating new institutions that secure it for all. 
 
So it is not surprising that, in facing the question of what principles of practical 
reason such views imply, Ronzoni turns to imperfect duties analogous to Natural 
Duties of Justice.50 Similarly, Cabrera links the goal of collective legal institutions 
to deliver peoples’ rights across the globe to Rawls’ NDJs. The rights justify the 
reforms as well as duties to engage in building institutions.51 Gilabert too, argues 
that even if people do not have institutions capable of extending justice to all, 
there might be “non-existing but accessible [institutional] structures” and 
“justice may be concerned with the latter as well.” People “may have a reason to 
contribute to the generation of such a structure (if doing so does not impose 
unreasonable costs)” which “is an application of the Natural Duty of Justice…”52 
These obligations are grounded in a general duty we have to bring about 
circumstances in which we can fulfil duties of justice that in current 
circumstances we are unable to fulfil.53 Of course, this assumes that we have 
such prior duties of justice to fulfil, which is the crux of this debate, as we shall 
see. Buchanan’s position is essentially the same, as outlined in the last section. 
These authors clearly assume a teleological account of distributive justice. If 
building certain shared institutions would increase the numbers enjoying the 
relevant outcome, that justifies a duty on each of us to do all we can towards 
building such institutions.54 The only limits are “excessive” or “unreasonable” 
demands, that remain undefined, but certainly cannot consist in practical 
fairness. 
 
This interpretation is of NDJs as deriving their normative force from a general 
duty to promote valuable outcomes.55 It does not begin by asking what demands 
are consistent with practical fairness, making justice a function of that. Rather, it 
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begins from what treatment promotes or fails to promote the relevant outcomes, 
and then frames our duties, including duties to create institutions, in light of this 
with the sole constraint that the duties should not be excessively costly. Thus 
global NDJs get their force from a teleological view of distributive justice. One 
cannot make a case for global NDJs by pointing to distributive injustice if 
distributive justice and injustice characterise the behaviour of a mediating agent 
of social cooperation. Remove the agent, and one removes the kind of behaviour 
capable of showing or not showing equal concern. Yet, the agency objection with 
which I began this paper makes most sense as appealing to the non-teleological 
conception of justice, given its focus on institutional agents (subjects) of justice. 
To the extent that arguments for NDJs depend on the teleological approach, they 
beg the question as a response to a non-teleological restriction on the scope of 
distributive justice. In what follows I consider whether there are alternative, 
non-question-begging, arguments that might ground global NDJs relating to 
distributive justice, including appeals to imperfect duties of assistance, rescue 
duties, and human rights. I will argue that each of these either relies on a 
teleological reading of our moral demands or, if they do not, they cannot then 
ground an argument for global NDJs. 
 
Rescue 
It is relatively uncontroversial that we have duties to rescue people in dire straits 
under certain circumstances. These include that 1) a person faces serious threats 
to her basic wellbeing, 2) we are able to help her escape the predicament, 3) we 
can do so at ‘not too great a cost’ to ourselves, and perhaps some further 
condition or feature of the circumstances picks out this case as directly relevant 
to us as agents, for example 4) we are in ‘proximity’ to the person in need or are 
in ‘confrontation’ with her and her plight.56 Some of the teleological theorists I 
have mentioned argue that because people in the world are in dire straits, say 
through poverty or lack of protection against abuse, we have a duty to rescue 
them.57 Rescuing all people in that condition would be excessively costly to us as 
individuals, so our duty is mitigated, however we could contribute to rescuing 
more people by working towards shared institutions that can assist everyone. 
This justifies a global NDJ to work towards constructing such institutions. 
 
Unfortunately, this argument assumes that the relevant and sufficient facts 
underpinning rescue duties are a person’s dire need and our capacity to do 
something towards rescuing her.58 This generates a duty owed to all those in 
need to overcome the limitations of our own mitigating conditions. Collective 
institutions will, apparently, do better and so we have a duty to bring them 
about.  First of all, it is unclear how we can have a duty to help all those people 
(pre-mitigation). That would imply a general duty to assist everyone on the basis 
of their need and our ability, which clearly violates the practical fairness test: it 
implies our adopted ends, priorities, and their pursuit, must be dedicated to 
serve the global end. Furthermore, the ‘not too costly’ mitigation condition fails 
to specify how much is too costly in terms compatible with practical fairness. So 
this interpretation of the duty, conditions (1)-(3), fails the practical fairness test. 
“Can” does not imply “ought”. That is why some authors include the additional 
condition (4) about proximity or confrontation. It prevents the duty being 
generalised in a way that violates practical fairness.59 And that implies that we 
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do not have a general duty to personally rescue everyone we might, globally, 
were we to replace our life-guiding commitments with that end. If the value 
behind rescue is understood as general concern for the plight others, that value 
is consistent with rescue duties that are only triggered in special conditions such 
as confrontation with specific people’s plight. These specific requirements do not 
conflict with practical fairness because they do not require us to adopt new 
priorities and ends to guide our lives. They simply require recognition of this 
value. A duty to adopt the setting up of institutions capable of rescuing every 
person in need globally as a life goal and priority is, however, inconsistent with 
practical fairness. So either rescue is limited in a way (4) that does not imply a 
duty of global distributive justice or it is unlimited, in line with the teleological 
account of distributive justice, but then fails the practical fairness test. 
 
Imperfect duties of assistance 
The NDJ argument for the applicability of distributive justice globally is often 
expressed in terms of imperfect duties, so as to avoid problems of 
demandingness faced by a robust personal duty of distributive justice.60 This 
would seem to be a way to avoid the problem of practical fairness. However, 
there is a problem here in how we interpret imperfect duties. 
 
One can take imperfect duties of assistance as a duties to adopt an end, in the 
sense of a value, or duties to adopt a goal. Adopting assistance as a value means 
adopting a general (rather than equal) concern for other people’s safety in one’s 
life commitments. It does not require us to adopt any one specific goal, and so 
does not require us to abandon or deprioritise any of our own ends. Various and 
varied actions can satisfy this value, such as helping an elderly person in trouble 
to cross a road, signing petitions for political prisoners, writing articles about the 
ethical treatment of refugees, volunteering with an organisation that runs a 
suicide helpline, campaigning against torture, donating money to disaster relief, 
supporting colleagues at work as a trade union volunteer, and so on. We might 
satisfy it it, given our other attachments, ends, and commitments, by doing a 
great deal or doing a modest amount or doing much more in one year than 
another. Actions directed against global poverty are just one of the myriad ways 
one can authentically express general concern for others and judgement is 
required to balance activities and personal resources dedicated to this 
commitment both against each other and against other commitments, projects, 
and relationships that matter in our lives.61 Adopting a value of this kind, then, 
does not correspond to a specific outcome and a quota we must fulfil towards it, 
but rather calls on us to exercise judgement in how we incorporate it among our 
own ends and priorities. It is not reducible to a general duty to show equal 
concern for every person’s plight, which would both relinquish our judgement in 
how to assist others and crowd out our own ends and priorities, in conflict with 
practical fairness. 
 
A duty to adopt a goal, however, means making tangible contributions to 
achieving a specific aim, where one can. The duty clearly implies helping to a 
specific degree but is non-specific as to which people we should personally help 
out of all those we could, given we cannot help everyone. This interpretation 
leads some authors to propose making imperfect duties more efficient by 
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adopting rules or institutions that end this lack of specificity by imposing clearer 
duties (“perfecting” our imperfect duties).62 This does not, however, explain 
what constitutes practical fairness in grounding duties to work towards the 
creation of institutions. Nor does it explain how we should reconcile the different 
and varied ways we can help others into one priority ordering that achieves 
specificity. We could stipulate a duty to prioritise among them all in a specific 
way, say by seriousness of need and numbers involved. But this would mean 
deprioritising our own judgements about who to assist and how, and our own 
personal commitments and pursuits too. To that extent it conflicts with practical 
fairness. Only imperfect duties interpreted as adopting a value such as a 
commitment to show general concern for others and using our judgement in 
making space for this among our aims and priorities, are consistent with 
practical fairness. But that interpretation is not consistent with NDJs to adopt the 
specific project of global institutional change. 
 
Basic Human Rights 
Another basis for NDJs might be a duty to establish institutional protection of 
human rights. Unlike rescue, this duty does not appeal to duties triggered by 
specific circumstances. It focuses on all people’s general entitlement to equal 
respect, which requires us to take measures to protect them from human rights 
violations.63 The problem with this response is that it implies a general duty for 
people to supply others, globally, with protection. Yet shouldering costs for the 
social protection of others is a feature of equal concern rather than equal respect. 
For individual agents to adopt equal concern they would have to adopt the 
personal life-goal and priority of pursuing the advancement of another person’s 
basic interests wherever they are threatened by attack or neglect and we can do 
something about it. Which means deprioritising our own aims and priorities. The 
problem is that this ground for priority in our practical reason generalises to 
accepting it in all cases where people’s basic interests are threatened. But a 
general de-prioritisation of our commitments and pursuits fails the practical 
fairness test. 
 
We could add restrictive conditions for when the duty applies, as where we are 
directly confronted with people in danger, and in that way avoid a general duty 
to deprioritise our own commitments. But then this is more like rescue. That 
seems right: under certain conditions we have duties to rescue others from 
abandonment and oppression. Which is different from a general personal duty to 
adopt and prioritise the personal goal of taking determinate steps against 
oppression everywhere it occurs and we might personally fight it. 
 
Perhaps the rights-based duty can be interpreted as an imperfect duty to assist 
others. Indeed, our judgements of how to incorporate assistance to others in our 
lives may lead us to prioritise assistance to those facing tyranny and neglect, and 
to support campaigns to change institutions as a more effective way to 
incorporate that end. A combination of rescue and imperfect duties, both for 
individuals and states acting through their foreign policy can focus on 
improvements in international standards. Depending on how they balance their 
other legitimate commitments, these agents can work with others to establish 
cooperative mechanisms for global assistance, and rescue people where good 
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faith judgement ascertains this is not too costly to other legitimate commitments. 
But again that is different from an obligation to adopt and prioritise the personal 
end of achieving global protective institutions as a personal life goal. It is both 
conditional on the cooperation of others, and does not set out any specific 
amount of required contribution. How one incorporates such ends and the place 
they have in our priorities is sensitive to judgement and balancing with other 
legitimate personal or state priorities. Limiting one’s contribution on this basis is 
not a failure in duty or justice. That contrasts with the NDJ interpretation of 
imperfect duties, which demands that we prioritise a specific international goal 
as our own and so fails the practical fairness test. 
 
Where our own institutions adopt arbitrary and harmful forms of distribution, 
ones that clash with equal respect, as opposed to reasonable if misguided 
standards, we do have special obligations to contribute to institutional change 
within reason. We have duties to vote against unjust measures, for example.64 
But here, our special duties flow from the fact that we are part of making such 
measures possible by upholding and cooperating with the authority that 
configures this social arrangement of rights and duties. These are NDJs in Rawls’ 
sense: duties within the context of institutional arrangements and authoritative 
institutions that “apply to us” (see section I). Respect for other societies’ 
mistaken institutions flows from their legitimate authority. But where 
institutions violate equal respect and political community is untenable, we have 
no special obligations except resistance and rescue. 
 
Arbitrariness of Membership 
Another route to global NDJs might be to ask what non-arbitrary justification we 
have for the existing membership composition of any political community and 
the way its institutions include or exclude people from membership. Even if the 
appropriate object of descriptions of fairness and unfairness is how political 
institutions treat people, what right is there to limit the treatment that is 
relevant to justice to some people rather than others? Why restrict who can 
benefit from any instance of cooperation, for example?65 
 
The problem here is that claims to inclusion cannot be based in considerations of 
distributive justice on this view, unless we interpret distributive justice in a 
teleological way. Only then would there be a claim by all persons who might 
benefit from some pattern of outcomes by joining a political community. 
Assuming that view, of course, begs the question against plausible non-
teleological accounts of distributive justice. That someone enjoys a better 
standard of living than another, because of the legitimate rule of states in which 
each lives, is not in itself unjust unless one has a teleological account of 
distributive justice. On the non-teleological account political communities 
satisfying the legitimacy test have authority to determine their membership and 
at least aim at equal concern for those over whom they exercise authority. There 
are of course rescue-based reasons to treat state boundaries as less restrictive 
than they currently are, and duties not to restrict them on grounds that violate 
equal respect. But again, these are different moral grounds for membership 
policy than NDJs relating to the desirability of a given global distribution. 
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Conclusion 
Nothing I have said above negates the possibility of standards for better 
institutions, whether fairer domestic ones or fairer dealing in international 
cooperation. It does not rule out people having duties to uphold and work 
towards their authoritative institutions producing just configurations of rights 
and duties. Nor does it rule out changing membership compositions, say through 
incorporating a new population or amalgamating two, for a variety of moral 
aims, such as rescue or to prevent conflict. As I have argued, those only 
constitute duties of justice on a question-begging, outcomes-focused, 
interpretation. On the alternative view of distributive justice I have set out, the 
agency objection with which I began this paper is not vulnerable to the response 
that it merely raises a feasibility problem rather than a conceptual one. To avoid 
begging the question, those responding need to dig deeper and address the more 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of justice that are in dispute. 
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